A central problem with all democracies, strong or weak, liberal or illiberal, is how best to protect minority interests from the tyranny of the majority.  Democratic theory assumes a foundation of capable, informed citizens with equal voice.  However, this theory is often applied to societies with diverse interests and cultures, unequal distribution of resources, and histories of oppression and ethnic conflict.  This is especially true, for example, in Latin American states with marginalized isolated indigenous populations, a history of Spanish colonialism and elite authoritarian rule, ethnic social stratification, and broad economic disparities.  In addition, contemporary democratic theorists agree that a strong democracy is not possible without strong democratic institutions, however Latin American states also lack strong democratic institutions to support and facilitate equal participation, effectively respond to citizen demands and mitigate conflicting interests, and constrain concentrated political and economic power and elite interests.  The historical trajectory of political development in Latin America has left an institutional legacy that has resulted in significantly marginalized indigenous and minority groups that are unable to fully participate in the decision-making process.  By identifying the democratic institutions that have the potential to empower marginalized groups, political leaders can focus their efforts on reforming those institutions in ways that are most likely to protect equal access and participation to the political process for marginalized and minority groups.  A review of the literature reveals that democracy can best empower marginalized and minority groups by restraining the power of elites, providing an arena for political discourse, and facilitating political participation.  Thus, at minimum in addition to free and fair elections, additional institutions that regulate individual power, facilitate political discourse, and support individual political action are required to guarantee self-rule of all people, including those that are traditionally marginalized from the political process.

Democracy as a Process for Restraining Power

The theory of democracy is based on the principle that each individual is the best judge of their interests, and thus capable of self-rule.  However, individual self-rule, and therefore democracy, is hindered in an environment of asymmetrical power relations that make collective judgements regarding conflicting interests, thus requiring political institutions that minimize the effect of power relations on self-rule.  Tilly (2007) argues that political regimes fall within a two-dimensional continuum defined by high or low state capacity and democratic or nondemocratic consultation processes (Tilly 20-21).  Democracy requires a regime that features broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultation between the state and its citizens, whose rights and obligations are determined by their membership in various social groups (Tilly 13-15).  When the demands of certain groups are excluded from the consultation process due to restricted access, influence, ability, or participation, these groups become marginalized from decision-making, decreasing the degree of democratization in a regime.  In order for a regime to democratize, it must increase integration between interpersonal networks of trust and public politics, increase the insulation of major categorical inequalities from public politics, and decrease the autonomy of major power centers in public politics (Tilly 23).  To do this, however, political institutions must be in place to facilitate these democratic processes and foster trust, equality, and autonomy between the state and its citizens.  Democracy also requires political institutions to be strong enough to intervene and alter non-state resources, activities, and interpersonal connections and relations in order to supervise and actualize the decisions made during the consultation process (Tilly 16).  Given the definitional concentration of power with elites and the equalization process of democratization, elites have the most to lose from democratization and at the same time the most influence on its trajectory (Tilly 38-40).  Thus, a strong democratic regime requires strong democratic institutions that restrain the power of elites and enable marginalized groups to express their demands and participate in the decision-making process.

While Tilly (2007) focuses more on the mechanisms that influence change in the democratization of a state, Schumpeter (2010) examines the essential mechanisms that must be present for political processes to be democratic.  Schumpeter (2010) argues that the democratic method is an institutional arrangement through which the people decide issues by the election, and recall, of individuals who compete for the power to act on their behalf (Schumpeter 225).  Every member of the community is responsible for contributing to political discourse and is free to compete for political leadership, although complex matters are necessarily entrusted to the expertise of specialists (Schumpeter 225-226).  If the competition for votes is skewed either among candidates or among voters, then less powerful interests will be marginalized by those that dominate, hindering the ability for self-rule.  There is never total consensus on what is best for the common good, however, or how best to achieve it, and the majority opinion is often influenced by historical processes and social patterns and adopted by politicians in self-interest (Schumpeter 238-240).  Thus, competition also ensues between issue groups over what is best for the common good, leading to the constant competitive struggle among elected officials for the approval of the people (Schumpeter 241-244).  This competition is only beneficial for the decision-making process if all viewpoints are given relatively equal consideration, which is not possible if the political sphere is skewed by powerful interests.  Thus, in order to provide a fair playing field for conflicting interests to compete, a strong democracy must have political institutions that restrain the power of dominant interest groups, allowing both the majority and minority opinions to be considered and judged fairly.

Whereas Schumpeter (2010) identifies competition as the driving force of democracy, Dahl (1989) highlights the importance of equality, but institutions that restrain the power of the elite are still necessary for either argument to be implemented.  Dahl (1989) argues that democracy can be justified only on the assumption that ordinary people are qualified to govern themselves, which also relies on the principle of equality for all persons (Dahl 97).  A system of governance is inevitable because a process for making decisions in imperative if individuals are going to live and associate with each other (Dahl 83).  Democracy is argued to be the best mechanism for governance because it is structured as rule by the people, or a representative group of individuals, who are each considered of equal intrinsic worth, with no person superior to another, for the purpose of making governmental decisions (Dahl 83).  If the interests of everyone are weighed equally and if each person is considered the best judge of their best interest, then every member of an association is best qualified to govern themselves and contribute to binding collective decisions (Dahl 105).  Thus, in order for a system of governance to be democratic, “the interests of every person who is subject to the decision must (within the limits of feasibility) be accurately interpreted and made known” during the collective decision-making process (Dahl 86).  In situations where groups of individuals and their interests are disregarded in the decision-making process, then, according to Dahl’s (1989) argument, the governance system cannot be considered democratic because not all person are considered equal and capable of self-rule.  Thus, democracy requires an institution that restrains the power of dominant members to ensure the interests of marginalized and minority members are also considered when evaluating and implementing governing decisions.

Democracy as an Arena for Political Discourse

One of the main reasons for equality in a democracy is that it allows for the interests of all citizens to be cultivated, expressed, and considered when making collective judgements on issues that affect the polity as a whole.  In this sense, democracies also require a space for the equal cultivation, expression and consideration of citizens interests.  Barber (1984) claims that the perception of democracy as a collection of individuals working toward their self-interest frames the government as an instrument of power and fear, creating an artificial community (Barber 23).  This is especially true when groups of citizens are effectively restricted from political participation, yet still obligated to follow its rules.  Liberal democracy has become a contradictory system of friction that forces individual interests to be prioritized in the name of equality, ascribes power to those deemed worthy to judge another’s interests in order to facilitate self-rule, and compresses the catalogue of social roles and issues into a single frequency allowing a complacent majority to often overrule an affected minority (Barber 202-203).  These effects are magnified as democratic governments become more hierarchical through the perpetual prioritization of interests, representational disparities, and simplification of political identities, causing select groups to become increasingly marginalized from concentrations of political power.  Moreover, Barber (1984) argues that the cultivation of political knowledge is shaped by participation which itself is driven by democratic principles, making political knowledge both autonomous and self-reproducing (Barber 167-168).  The past exists as reference and future political judgment is socially reproduced through present actions and is only as static as the ever-fluctuating common will (Barber 169).  Thus, the inequalities and injustices that are present in democracies becomes reproduced and perpetuated through the cultivation of political knowledge and the expanding power hierarchies.  Barber (1984) argues, then, that the purpose of politics instead must be to develop institutions, customs, and attitudes that will enable citizens to live with conflict and disagreement, motivate action, mold to social conditions, nurture political judgment, and aid decision-making and implementation (Barber).  By cultivating democratic institutions which rely on diplomacy, participation, and adaptation rather than fear, power, and judgement, democracy can foster and reproduce patterns of equality and inclusion rather than perpetuating power hierarchies and the marginalization of less powerful interests, while also recasting the political narrative to include traditionally marginalized perspectives.

At the center of Barber’s (1984) argument is the prescription for a shift in the structure of political discourse in order to equalize power hierarchies and move toward achieving the common will.  He claims that inclusive political conversation has the power to re-conceptualize private self-interest as a common good, allow people to vent their opposition, and give public status to personal convictions (Barber 178-198).  Symbols can also supplement this conversation through the imaginative reconstruction of the past in live images and the cultivation and sustainability of normative political beliefs (Barber 191).  Shifting the focus of conversation from private interest to the common good will at once bridge individual divisions and broaden the scope of decision-making to include all citizens, those with power and without, in the conversation and set a foundation for the reproduction of the common narrative to include perspectives of less powerful groups.  Barber (1984) also argues that equality will follow only when language is democratized and each citizen has some control over the terms the community uses to define public and private identities (Barber 193).  Thus, in a strong democracy, agenda-setting is approached through democratic talk where no voice, position, or authority is privileged and decisions are deferred until an agreement is reached (Barber 181-182, 207).  Each citizen must also have the ability to contribute and have a stake in the common good (Barber 209-212).  To achieve this equality in discourse, however, democratic institutions are necessary to facilitate democratic conversation and restrain the power of political elites from dominating the discussion, providing marginalized and minority groups equal space in collective decision making.

Warren (n.d.) builds on Barber’s (1984) prescription for a shift in public discourse by identifying associations as the mechanism with which to foster such a discourse.  Warren (n.d.) agrees that democratic politics are guided by talk and require power arrangements that enable inclusive processes of argument and guarantee private autonomy (Warren 67).  In this way, marginalized and minority groups are given space and a voice in decision making.  To accomplish this, democracy requires institutionalized procedures that enable the public discourse through which individuals determine what is right both as an individual and as a member of the collective (Warren 60).  Democratic self-rule also requires an “equal distribution of power to make collective decisions,” and “equal participation in collective judgments” in order to restrain the power of elites and provide equal space for all citizens to actualize their autonomy (Warren 60).  Specifically, democratic legitimacy can be enhanced if associations provide an equal opportunity for citizens to influence political outcomes (Warren 92).  Thus, a democracy requires strong institutions to enforce systems of rights, equalize power among social actors, and facilitate collective decision making (Warren 91).  Warren (n.d.) also identifies the potential for associations to increase democracy through their role in facilitating public discourse, for both elites and marginalized groups.  Associations have the potential for coordination that governments and markets lack by generating communicative power within public spheres, and providing substantive democratic legitimacy to policies (Warren 69, 91).  Associations support broad public discourse by contributing to the political capacities of all citizens, providing the social infrastructure to unite individual and political autonomy, and transforming individual autonomy into collective decisions (Warren 61).  Associations restrain the power of elites and shift the development of public agendas to less powerful citizens by disseminating information, advancing public deliberations, representing marginal and excluded voices, and highlighting commonalities (Warren 69).  Moreover, associations support inclusive democratic participation by actualizing citizen voices in representative institutions, providing important topical resources, and monitoring governments for compliance (Warren 69-71).  Thus, by providing structure to the public sphere, facilitating public discourse, and ensuring transparency and accountability of the elites, associations open a space for marginalized groups and minorities to participation in collective decision making.

The coordination and monitoring potential of associations, can also go a step further and serve as a mechanism for resistance against powerful actors.  Warren (n.d.) explains that “silence serves the wealthy and powerful well, and public argument is one of the few resources through which poorer and weaker members of society can exert influence” (Warren 81).  Associations reserve a space within the public discourse for citizens to assert their right to participate and be heard in the decision-making process, ensuring equal access for all citizens and an alternative, informal venue for representation (Warren 82).  Although associations often emerge along class lines, enforcing social divisions (Warren 73), providing the space for the expression of marginalized and minority interests is an essential first step to actualizing the political autonomy of these groups.  This alternative venue can also serve as a mechanism for conflict resolution outside of formal government structures, allowing issues to be addressed and resolved that otherwise would not gain the attention of more formal governing bodies (Warren 92).  The potential for conflict resolution further increases the representation of marginalized and minority groups, who may have their interests heard and considered within the public sphere, even if those interests do not rise to the level of formal representation.  The coordination potential of associations, however, can also be used to hold the government accountable by organizing the people in opposition to the government and demanding change in the decision-making process (Warren 85).  The potential for resistance is what gives associations representational power within a democracy by holding the government accountable to the interests of its citizens and providing transparency in the governing process (Warren 85).  Again, while associations may form around class divisions and fail to include marginalized and minority groups within their organizational efforts, the social infrastructure provided by associations creates a space in which marginalized and minority groups have the opportunity to exercise their right to participation within a democracy.  What is necessary, however, are strong institutions that enable and protect to right to association for marginalized and minority groups within the public sphere so they are not drowned out by more powerful associations and have equal access to the decision-making process.

Democracy as a Mechanism for Participation

If a democracy is able to equalize power among actors and provide an open space for political discourse and collective decision making, there is no guarantee that marginalized and minority groups will have the skills, resources, and capability to participate in the public sphere.  Thus, democracy also requires institutions that enable and support the political participation of all citizens, including access to information, education, and social networks.  Levine and Molina (2011) argue that the quality of democracy should be analyzed through the mechanisms that facilitate citizen control over the decision-making process.  The political process is democratic only when access and participation by all individuals and organized groups, directly or through representatives, are available and unhindered throughout society (Levine and Molina 4-5).  Thus, by definition, a political process is not democratic if it excludes the direct participation or representation of select groups.  In addition, the democratic quality of that process must include free, fair, and frequent elections, unrestricted equal access to voting and institutions, accessible and sufficient information for citizens to make a rational judgment, responsive and accountable elected officials empowered to govern, and an inclusive citizenship (Levine and Molina 4).  Among the factors that constitute these mechanisms, Levine and Molina (2011) identify several factors that affect the empowerment of marginalized and minority groups in a democracy, including access to information, access to associations, organizations and political resources, ease of voting and other forms of participation, input in agenda-making processes, accountability mechanisms, access to education, and avenues for opposition (Levine and Molina 5-12).  Although Levine and Molina (2011) may still consider governments democratic if certain groups were marginalized from the decision-making process, they would argue that the active support and efforts to include marginalized group are necessary for a strong democracy, including efforts to address language, cultural, social, economic and educational barriers that would hinder access to the political process.  “Populations and governments,” they argue, “can develop social, educational, or communications policies that may reduce the differences in political resources between social groups, and, in this way, reduce political inequality even in conditions of broad socioeconomic inequalities” (Levine and Molina 14).  Efforts to increase the quality of democracy, however, and empower marginalized and minority groups rely greatly on the ability of democratic institutions to implement the mechanisms identified, support equal participation, and ensure the performance of the government coincides with the aspirations of citizens.

Levine and Molina (2011) present a thorough operationalization of mechanisms that contribute to a strong democracy, but in the absence of those mechanisms, Hilgers (2012) identifies one strategy which may help provide a foundation for their development.  Although, clientelism is traditionally viewed as an authoritarian mechanism that hinders the development of an independent civil society, Hilgers (2012) argues that clientelism can also improve accountability and access to the state, especially for marginalized and minority groups.  Even though clientelism involves a long-term relationship of unequal power where goods and services are exchanged for political allegiance, it also allows clients, especially poor clients, to receive benefits that outweigh their costs (Hilgers 10-11).  In addition, the predictability of the relationship can be preferred to the uncertain and impracticable outcomes of formal rules and processes that hinder political access and participation for these groups (Hilgers 8).  Moreover, the benefits of clientelism are also increased when transferred from an authoritarian to a democratic political environment.  Democratic competition increases relative power in a clientelistic relationship and active networks play the role of civil society by sharing ideas, engaging in debates, encouraging community involvement, holding officials accountable, and facilitating political participation (Hilgers 14).  In this way, for marginalized and minority groups, clientelism can serve as a mechanism for political representation and access to the state, especially in states with weak democratic institutions.  However, since clientelism only provides access to resources for those with a patron, it can also further inequality within marginalized and minority groups by reserving access for select individuals (Hilgers 11).  Thus, in democracies without strong institutions that enable and support equal political participation, clientelistic relationships may develop and serve the purpose of these institutions for marginalized and minority groups.  However, inequality and marginalization will persist to some degree without the strong institutions that work specifically to combat inequality and support full political participation.

Canal (2012) expands on Hilgers’ (2012) claim that clientelism can create the foundation on which more democratic and participatory modes of governance can build by examining how clientelistic relationships contributed to the political skills citizens which was necessary for the successful implementation of participatory decentralization.  Participatory decentralization helps governments govern and offer services while enlarging participatory democratic spaces, by offering greater transparency and accountability, creating more opportunities for resident input, and allocating resources based on the level of participation (Canel 138).  Canal (2012) argues that communities in which participatory decentralization was most successful had developed the skills and capacities that were more easily transferable to participatory modes of governance, including the ability to navigate complex political relations, propose projects, manage resources, and become involved in community development initiatives (Canel 150).  In addition, he finds that the municipalities that transitioned from clientelistic networks to participatory decentralization were best equipped with the political resources, capacities, and skills needed to adapt to the requirements of participatory decentralization, enabling them to nurture democratic practices, build trusting relations, and establish constructive partnerships (Canel 156).  Thus, in theory participatory decentralization would enable and support increase political participation by marginalized and minority groups, but requires a certain level of political skills to be successful, which can be developed through clientelistic relationships.  Without these capacity-building relationships, however, it is unlikely broad political participation will succeed in absence of strong civil society and other democratic institutions that provide the citizen capacity and skill-building needed for broad and equal political participation.

Conclusion

Democratic theory is based on the assumption that citizens are equal in capacity, access, and ability, however, in democracies that lack strong democratic institutions, that is not the case.  The entrenched nature institutions can provide structure to the political process that support, facilitate and encourage democratic practices, however, the wrong institutions can just as easily entrench the injustices and inequalities found in undemocratic regimes.  Thus, it is important to understand how institutions affect the nature of power, equality, competition, discourse, autonomy, association, opposition, information dissemination, resource allocation, and political capacity of all individuals in a society.  Although a single institution may address more than one element, a true democracy must be considered more than free, fair, and competitive elections, but also must include institutions that enable and support the equality, association, and participatory capacity of all citizens, including marginalized and minority groups.

References

Barber, Benjamn R. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. THe Regents of the University of California, 1984.

Canel, Eduardo. "'Fragmented Clientelism' in Montevideo: Training Ground for Community Engagement with Participatory Decentralization?" Hilgers, Tina. Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 137-157.

Dahl, Robert A. Democracy and Its Critics. Yale University Press, 1989.

Hilgers, Tina. "Democratic Processes, Clientelistic Relationships, and the Material Goods Problem." Hilgers, Tina. Clientelism in Everyday Latin American Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 3-22.

Levine, Daniel H. and Jose E. Molina. "Evaluating the Quality of Democracy in Latin America." Levine, Daniel H. and Jose E. Molina. The Quality of Democracy in Latin America. Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2011. 1-19.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010.

Tilly, Charles. Democracy. 2007.

Warren, Mark. Democracy and Association. n.d.